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Abstract
In March 2004 the Kenyan government set out its 
radical Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA). Almost 
a decade on, remarkably little progress has been made 
on its priority areas. Beyond bureaucratic resistance to 
economic reform, we explain the political roots of inertia 
in the SRA case, encompassing both the political logic 
of maintaining commodity chain-based state 
organisations and the impossibility of achieving the 
necessary collective action for radical reform within a 
dysfunctional coalition government. Continuation of the 
historic approach to agricultural development in Kenya 
is good for regional elites but fails to deliver critical public 
goods for poorer smallholder producers. We, therefore, 
consider what political changes might be needed before 
more radical reforms to Kenyan agricultural policy can 
be implemented.
Keywords: Kenya, agricultural policy, Strategy for 
Revitalising Agriculture, public goods, democratisation
Introduction
Despite relatively well-developed manufacturing, 
tourism and services sectors, the Kenyan economy 
remains highly dependent on agriculture as a source 
both of employment and of foreign exchange. In the 
first couple of decades after independence, Kenyan 
agricultural performance was widely regarded as good 
(World Bank 1994). Although the agricultural sector was 
taxed, such taxation was not as severe as in some other 
countries of Africa, due in part to the fact that agricultural 
interests in the form of the “Kikuyu gentry” were at the 
heart of early post-independence governments (Bates 
1981; Lofchie 1994). Another factor associated with 
strong agricultural performance was the establishment 
or maintenance of effective agricultural “institutions” – 
often state, parastatal or otherwise state-sponsored 
organisations – that provided services to producers 
within particular commodity chains. These included 
coffee cooperatives, Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
(KCC) in the dairy industry, National Cereals and Produce 
Board (maize), Kenya Farmers’ Association (input supply), 
Kenya Meat Commission and the smallholder Kenya 
Tea Development Authority (KTDA). During the Moi 
presidency, the emphasis within agricultural policy 
switched from export promotion to food self-sufficiency 
(Lofchie 1994) and several of these organisations - the 
management of which became increasingly politicised 
- were allowed to decline during the 1990s. Overall 
agricultural performance, and the economy in general, 
also declined.
When the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
government headed by Mwai Kibaki came to power at 
the end of 2002, there was widespread agreement 
amongst the Kenyan policy making elite that something 
had to be done to improve agricultural performance. 
Agriculture was highlighted as a priority sector within 
the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and 
Employment Creation (ERS) produced in April 2003. Work 
started almost immediately on a sectoral strategy for 
agriculture, eventually culminating in the Strategy for 
Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) that was launched by the 
President in March 2004. The SRA, however, did not just 
signal the government’s intention to “do something 
about agriculture”; it proposed a radical reform of the 
role of the state within the sector. Numerous, often 
overlapping and sometimes redundant pieces of 
agricultural legislation were to be harmonised into one 
or a few pieces of framework legislation. The number of 
state organisations was to be reduced through closure 
or privatisation, while the mandates of others were to 
be scaled back and still others could be put into public-
private partnerships to increase their efficiency. The 
overall aim was to refocus the state on the provision of 
key public goods, such as research and extension (which 
in theory should benefit all producers), road and irrigation 
infrastructure, creating greater space for the private 
sector to expand the services it provided to producers, 
most notably output marketing, but also input supply 
and financial services.
As will be discussed in more detail below, this did not 
happen, despite the priority that the government had 
attached to agricultural recovery and the support that 
SRA received from Kenya’s international development 
partners. Radical reform of the state’s role in agriculture 
encountered both bureaucratic and political obstacles, 
while systemic reforms to ensure more effective provision 
of national public goods made little headway. Instead, 
continuing the Kenyan historical tradition, efforts were 
made to improve the performance of individual state 
organisations so as to revive specific commodity sectors, 
for example dairy and beef. Then, in 2010 the SRA – 
originally intended to run from 2004-2014 – was 
superseded by the Agricultural Sector Development 
Strategy 2010-2020 (ASDS). ASDS formally claims to build 
on and learn from SRA’s “success”, but in practice it 
downplays radical reform of the state’s role in agriculture 
in favour of incremental reform of some existing 
institutions, while recommitting to many of the other 
actions that SRA was already supposed to have 
accomplished. Thus, little has changed in the sector. 
Specifically, the centrality of commodity chain-focused 
state organisations within Kenyan agricultural 
development policy remains.
While these organisations are undoubtedly associated 
with some of the major successes in Kenyan agricultural 
development, they can also be criticised on several 
grounds: they tend to perform unevenly over both time 
and space and, even when they function well, the main 
beneficiaries are often better-resourced farmers, rather 
than poor smallholders. Activities of these organisations 
are unevenly distributed; high potential regions have 
relatively high concentration of activities by these 
organisations compared to marginal areas. Thus 
beneficiaries also are high potential regions of the 
country.  As a result, the agricultural sector’s contribution 
to the country’s growth, poverty reduction and food 
security objectives is diminished. World Bank 2008 report 
that the poverty rate in Kenya in 2005/06 was both 
surprisingly high (47%) for an economy as developed as 
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Kenya’s and almost unchanged from that observed in 
1981. 85% of the poor live in rural areas. Despite its talk 
of success, even Government of Kenya 2010 (p5) 
recognises that the country was not on track to achieve 
either the poverty reduction or hunger targets set in the 
ERS, even before the setback due to the conflict of 2008.
In what follows we explain the continued centrality 
of state organisations within Kenyan agriculture and 
the contrastingly weak delivery of national public 
goods, such as agricultural extension, in terms of the 
ethno-regional basis of Kenyan politics. We also argue 
that high levels of poverty and inequality in rural Kenya 
are perpetuated through this pattern of agricultural 
policy. Some, including Bates 1989, expected that 
democratisation would lead to a greater focus on policy 
issues in national political competition and a chance 
for poor smallholder households to use their numerical 
advantage to demand more supportive policy and 
investment. However, the ethno-regional basis of Kenyan 
politics has so far survived the democratisation process 
largely unscathed, and demand from poor smallholder 
households for greater investment in agricultural public 
goods that would benefit them remains very weak. We 
conclude the paper by asking what political changes 
might need to take place in Kenya before radical reforms 
to Kenyan agricultural policy can be implemented, that 
could deliver more effective support services to the 
majority of the country’s smallholder producers.
Kenya Context
In agro-ecological terms, Kenya is a highly diverse 
country. Only about 20% of the country’s land is classed 
as medium-high potential and this supports high 
population densities, whilst the remainder is mainly arid 
or semi-arid and supports only a small proportion of the 
population (World Bank 2008). Reflecting the high degree 
of agro-ecological diversity within the country, Kenya is 
globally or regionally significant as a producer of tea, 
coffee, horticultural products, dairy and meat products, 
as well as producing significant quantities of the main 
staple food crop maize and sugar for the domestic 
market. According to Government of Kenya 2010, the 
agriculture sector accounts for 65% of national exports 
and 70% of informal employment in rural Kenya, and 
provides livelihood to about 80% of the population.
However, in the past two-three decades strong 
agricultural performance in some crops and regions at 
some times has not been sufficient to reduce rural poverty. 
Two major factors explain this: the first is that overall 
agricultural growth has been disappointing; the second is 
that rural Kenya is characterised by high inequality (World 
Bank 2008). The analysis of World Bank 2008 highlights 
high inequality1 both across regions – regional dummies 
remain significant in regressions to explain poverty  even 
when rainfall is included – and within regions. One 
manifestation of this latter phenomenon is high and rising 
Gini coefficients for landholdings within regions, now 
approaching Latin American levels, as large landholdings 
for some persist alongside increasing populations. These 
large landholdings reflect both colonial acquisition of 
large areas of high potential land and the political deals 
done when some of that land was redistributed to black 
Kenyans in the early post-independence years. Whilst 
President Kenyatta and those close to him acquired large 
tracts of land, high potential land in parts of the Rift Valley 
was also retained in relatively large holdings for elite 
members of the Kalenjin tribe (Bates 1989).2
Kenya is also an ethnically diverse country, scoring 
highly on indices of ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
(Posner 2004; World Bank 2008). According to the 2009 
census, the five largest ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luyha, Luo, 
Kalenjin and Kamba) together account for just under 
65% of the population, with a further three (Kisii, Meru, 
Mijikenda) each accounting for around 5%. As each of 
these groups lives predominantly in one area of the 
country (plus major cities), there is a strong association 
between particular groups and most of the main 
agricultural value chains in the country.
As will be discussed below, with the decline of the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU), the dominant political 
party for the first four decades after independence 
(under Presidents Kenyatta and Moi), there is very weak 
institutionalisation of political parties in the country. 
Instead, parties are vehicles for mobilising support 
behind prominent individuals. Capturing political power 
requires constructing (and then maintaining) a coalition 
of political champions from enough of the country’s 
numerically large ‘ethnic regions’ to gain an overall 
majority of votes. In 2002 Mwai Kibaki led a coalition 
comprising all major groups except the Kalenjin, united in 
their conviction that it was time to replace president Moi. 
However, strains within this coalition appeared within its 
first year in power, widely seen as being caused by the 
actions of a group of senior politicians from his region (the 
so-called “Mount Kenya mafia” comprising senior Kikuyu 
and Meru politicians) to strengthen their grip on power 
when the President was out of action for a few months 
following a stroke. Internal divisions within the coalition 
continued to deepen and in 2005 Raila Odinga, a Luo and 
a leading figure in the coalition, led the “no” campaigners 
in the referendum on a new constitution although still 
formally part of the government. He and his supporters 
were then expelled from the government by President 
Kibaki and joined with other leading regional figures 
from the “no” campaign to form the Orange Democratic 
Movement that contested the 2007 elections against 
President Kibaki and his new party, the Party of National 
Unity (PNU). After the inconclusive presidential election 
result and subsequent violence, a Coalition government 
was mediated in which, once again, the major political 
tensions have been within the government, rather than 
between government and opposition.
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State Agricultural 
Organisations in Kenya
Bates 1989 explains that state-supported agricultural 
institutions first became a feature of the Kenyan 
agricultural scene during the colonial period, as 
institutions were created and forged to advance the 
economic and political interests of particular settler 
groups. This pattern continued in the post-independence 
years. However, institutions that generated rents for 
particular producer groups also became sources of 
political patronage that political leaders could and did 
exploit, whilst interest groups organised themselves 
to defend the rents that they now received. Thus the 
perpetuation of rural power and inequality through 
agricultural institutions, observed by Bates 1989, is 
still a feature of Kenyan life, despite two decades of 
democratisation. Moreover, those who benefit from 
the rents created through such institutions still have the 
power to defend them against radical reform.
One of the most prominent state agricultural 
organisations in Kenya is the National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB). This buys maize from surplus producing 
parts of the country after harvest, then stores it either 
for sale to millers or other traders when prices in major 
urban centres rise later in the season or for distribution 
as emergency assistance during times of drought, most 
commonly in the arid and semi-arid north and east of 
the country. Bates 1989 narrates the rise to prominence 
of the NCPB during the 1978-82 drought, just after Moi 
became President. Strengthening NCPB enabled the new 
President to supply food to consumers in the country’s 
cities and in drought-stricken areas. However, it also 
entailed an increase in the number of NCPB buying posts 
around the Rift Valley – Moi’s home area and also the main 
maize producing region – which enhanced his capacity to 
distribute future support to farmers in this area, and his 
Kalenjin group in particular, through NCPB. In turn, this 
reinforced the Rift Valley’s position as the “breadbasket” 
of the country. Hence, Nyoro et al. 1999 found that 70% 
of all marketed maize in Kenya came from four districts 
of the Rift Valley, populated largely by Kalenjin, while the 
majority of producers in all other parts of the country 
were deficit or net deficit producers.
Jayne et al. 2008 examine the impact of NCPB buying 
prices on the maize prices prevailing in Kitale (Rift Valley) 
and Nairobi wholesale markets over the period 1989-
2004. They find that, in the 1989-94 period, when maize 
marketing was only partially liberalised3, NCPB buying 
prices served to reduce prices in the two wholesale 
markets by around 20%. However, over the decade 1995-
2004 – after market liberalisation but, perhaps equally 
significantly, also after the introduction of competitive 
multi-party democracy - NCPB buying prices served to 
raise maize prices in the two wholesale markets by around 
20%. The principal beneficiaries of this policy were the 
large maize surplus producing farms in the four districts 
of Rift Valley. By contrast, consumers, i.e. most of the 
rest of the country, lost out, with poor consumers, both 
urban and rural, hardest hit due to their limited ability 
to afford higher prices for staple food. Jayne et al. 2008 
(p314) note that, “Mean wholesale market prices in the 
major surplus zone of Kitale and the capital city, Nairobi, 
between January 1989 and December 2004 have been 
$160 and $197 per metric ton, respectively, considerably 
higher than world market levels.” Meanwhile, despite 
the high prices offered to surplus producers by NCPB, 
Kenya remained chronically maize deficit at national level 
throughout the period in question.
NCPB operations conveyed considerable rents to Rift 
Valley maize producers during the 1990s, but several of 
the other state agricultural organisations,  especially 
those operating in parts of the country populated by 
President Moi’s political opponents, were allowed to 
decline (see, for example, Atieno and Kanyinga 2008 
for the case of Kenya Cooperative Creameries). Overall 
agricultural growth in the country also declined, a 
phenomenon that was widely (e.g. Government of Kenya 
2003) and popularly linked to the declining effectiveness 
of agricultural support organisations in the country. For 
example, in 2007-09 Future Agricultures Consortium 
undertook work in four districts in Kenya during which 
farmer focus group were asked to reflect on agricultural 
performance in their district over previous decades. The 
1990s were uniformly identified as the decade of worst 
performance and decline of farmer support organisations 
was regularly cited as a major reason for this (Future 
Agricultures Consortium 2010).
The common equation of strong commodity chain-
focused state organisations with good agricultural 
performance notwithstanding, Kenya’s reliance on 
such organisations has not been without its problems. 
These are magnified if, as argued later, reliance on such 
organisations occurs instead of investment in national 
public goods in support of smallholder agriculture. Firstly, 
both coverage and performance of such organisations 
has been (and is) uneven across the country. Being 
associated with major commodity chains, i.e. where 
significant marketable surpluses of a certain crop are 
produced, they tend to be found where such chains are 
found. Being channels by which political patronage can 
be disbursed to favoured groups, which organisations 
are managed effectively and well resourced depends 
in large part on who is in power and whose support 
they are seeking or maintaining. One major ethnic 
group that has enjoyed relatively little share of power 
in post-independence Kenya are the Luos. Insofar as the 
southern Luo-dominated parts of western Kenya have a 
“traditional” cash crop, it is cotton. During the 1990s, the 
support institutions for cotton production in the country 
were allowed to die completely4.
Secondly, but relatedly, the performance of 
commodity chain-focused state organisations tends to 
be uneven over time. Periods of “revitalisation” when a 
sympathetic government is in power can be followed 
by neglect when the complexion of the government 
changes. Equally, “revitalisation” might occur when a new 
government wishes to make a political impact. However, 
over time the inefficiencies commonly associated with 
state organisations, especially ones where management 
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is politicised, can set in. A recent example of this is KCC, 
which was relaunched in 2003 (see below), providing 
a valuable boost to dairy producers by heightening 
competition with the two existing private milk processors. 
However, as production increased in response, it did not 
expand its processing capacity to match, with the result 
that farmers found themselves throwing milk away by 
late 2009.
Thirdly, the benefits from commodity chain-focused 
state organisations are often captured disproportionately 
by larger producers. This is because the easiest ways 
to distribute patronage are through output price 
interventions, credit or input subsidies. In absolute terms, 
the former give the greatest benefit to those who sell the 
greatest quantities of the crop. Furthermore, where they 
are introduced on their own, i.e. without accompanying 
measures to support productivity improvement, a 
farmer’s ability to increase supply in response to higher 
prices depends on his/her ability to access additional 
land, capital and/or labour. Poor households may not 
have this ability. These inequalities are well illustrated by 
the maize case, where Jayne et al. 2008 (p323) calculate 
that, “less than 3% of the farms in this nationwide sample 
account for 50% of all the maize sold”. Meanwhile, the 
cost of credit or input subsidies often means that they 
have to be rationed and the better off are often better 
connected to able to capture them.
The Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture
When the NARC government came to power at the end 
of 2002, it did so “with a primary mandate of reversing 
the many years of poor economic performance and weak 
governance” (Government of Kenya 2003, preface). It, 
therefore, produced an Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS) in April 2003, 
drawing heavily on the NARC election manifesto. This 
in turn was a compilation of ideas from the 15 or so 
parties that comprised the NARC coalition. However, 
this did not make it a compromise document, as the 
clear intention was to be bold in distinguishing NARC 
from the government of President Moi that it was seeking 
to overthrow. On the economy (ERS also had sections 
on governance and on social sectors), ERS adopted a 
strongly pro-private sector line, reflecting inter alia the 
personal convictions of President Kibaki. Along with 
other productive sectors, agriculture was described as 
the “core” of the ERS and work started almost immediately 
on a sectoral strategy for agriculture to expand on the 
principal commitments for agriculture made in ERS.
Unfortunately, there were some delays in producing 
the strategy for agriculture. Firstly, when the President 
was hospitalised within a few months of taking office, 
leadership on national economic strategy was lost. 
Secondly, according to Howell 2004, a Tegemeo Institute 
report that focused primarily on agricultural ministry 
reform was not “fully accepted by the stakeholders”. 
Therefore, in December 2003, another report was 
commissioned. This was prepared by officers from 
the Ministries of Agriculture (MoA) and Livestock and 
Fisheries Development (MoLFD), with assistance from 
a small team of local consultants, and was launched by 
the recovered President as the Strategy for Revitalising 
Agriculture (SRA) in March 2004.
The SRA did not just signal the government’s intention 
to “do something about agriculture”; it proposed a radical 
reform of the role of the state within the sector. This 
reflected both the President’s stated commitment to 
private sector-led growth and the authors’ analysis of 
the future of Kenyan agriculture, namely that it could not 
continue as it was if it was to contribute to the growth and 
poverty reduction aspirations of the new government. 
They observed that the most dynamic sectors, e.g. 
horticulture, were largely free of state control, whereas 
state organisations were generally inefficient.
This radical vision was clearly signalled in the 
President’s preface to the SRA document, then more fully 
articulated in Section 5.3 on the “Legal and Regulatory 
Framework”. This noted that the sector was “afflicted 
with too many laws”, most of which were out-of-
date and many of which justified the continuation of 
“dysfunctional” state organisations that continued to 
perform commercial activities even though this was 
“inconsistent with the government’s stated policy to 
withdraw from commercial activities”. “Further, there 
are many commodity-specific laws that set out costly, 
separate institutional and management arrangements.” In 
light of this, SRA proposed to prepare “a single generic ‘all 
encompassing’ Agriculture Act and replace all commodity 
or activity specific acts with regulations under the single 
Agriculture Act.” Relatedly, it committed to “Privatise or 
outsource commercial activities presently performed 
by the government or parastatals” and to “reduce the 
multiplicity of regulatory or research parastatals”.
The strategy as a whole was set to run from 2004-
2014. In light of the urgent “need for a rapid recovery of 
the sector”, six “fast track” priority areas were identified 
in section 10.2:
1.  “Reviewing and harmonizing the legal, 
regulatory and institutional framework” (as 
above);
2.  “Improving delivery of research, extension 
and advisory support services”, central to 
which was strengthening the funding base for 
agricultural research efforts and decentralising 
primary responsibility for extension provision 
to district level, where contracting in of private 
extension services alongside public provision 
was contemplated;
3.  “Restructuring and privatising non-core 
functions of parastatals and ministries to 
bring about efficiency, accountability, and 
effectiveness” (as above);
4.  “Increasing access to quality farm inputs and 
financial services”, where – contrary to other 
parts of the strategy – the need to revitalize 
public input supply organizations such as the 
Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) 
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and the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) was 
recognised, given that efforts to encourage 
farmer organisations, private stockists and 
microfinance organisations to upscale their 
services to farmers could take some time to 
generate results;
5.  “Formulating food security policy and 
programmes”, and
6.  “Taking measures to improve access to markets, 
for example, rural roads and internal taxes”.
The SRA also set out its implementation framework 
in some detail. This comprised:
•	 An	“annual	National	Forum	of	the	stakeholders	
in the sector, organized by the lead ministries” 
and to be presided over by “the highest political 
authority” (i.e. President or representative), to 
“ensure political will, give the strategy visibility 
and provide a platform for reviewing progress 
in the implementation of the strategy and the 
extent to which its objectives are being 
achieved”
•	 An	Inter-Ministerial	Coordination	Committee	
(ICC) to be “composed of permanent secretaries 
of the lead and collaborating ministries and 
representatives of the private sector” and 
“responsible for coordinating the planning of 
the strategy at the sector level and monitoring 
its implementation”. Officially, the lead minis-
tries for SRA were Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development 
and Ministry of Cooperative Development – 
below referred to as the three “core” ministries 
- plus Ministry of Local Government. Several 
others - including Roads and Public Works, 
Water and Natural Resources, Lands and 
Settlement, plus Regional Development 
Authorities – were counted as collaborating 
ministries. 
•	 The	ICC	was	to	be	assisted	by	a	Technical	Inter-
ministerial Committee (TIC), comprised of staff 
from the four lead ministries, that was respon-
sible for preparing rolling implementation 
plans
•	 Sector	Working	Groups	were	to	be	established	
by individual ministries to provide advice and 
“independent peer review” of TIC implementa-
tion reports.
With the benefit of hindsight, we highlight the role 
envisaged for the annual National Forum in articulating 
and sustaining political will for the strategy. While the lead 
ministries were to organise such events, the momentum 
to drive implementation was apparently expected to 
come in large part from non-government stakeholders 
(commercial private sector, perhaps NGOs) who stood 
to benefit from its scaling back of state involvement 
in agricultural activities. In practice, such forums were 
convened only in 2005 and 2008 (Lundgren 2010).
The envisaged role for Ministers is not explicitly 
spelled out in the implementation framework. Rather, 
responsibility for getting the strategy implemented 
resided at the permanent secretary level, assisted by the 
technical staff within the TIC. Given the radical intent 
of the strategy and the institutional vested interests 
that it challenged, successful implementation required 
(coordinated) ministerial drive. Unfortunately, in practice 
this was to be lacking. 
The tight time frame for producing the SRA document 
meant that there was very little consultation – within 
government or outside – during its development, even 
though it set out to chart a course for at least three 
ministries, with implications for multiple others, too. 
According to one informant5, the Minister of Livestock 
threatened not to attend the launch as a result of this, 
but had to go because the strategy was being launched 
in person by the President.
After the launch, the permanent secretaries of the 
three core ministries asked consultants to draft three-
year plans for action in four of the six “fast track” priority 
areas, including.
•	 reform	of	parastatals.	Here,	in	the	spirit	of	the	
SRA document, the consultants recommended 
abolishing the Coffee Board and Meat 
Commission, and privatising the Dairy Board, 
Pyrethrum Board and Sugar Board. They recom-
mended keeping the National Cereals & 
Produce Board, the Plant Health Inspectorate 
and the Pest Control Products Board to provide 
regulation and/or other public goods, but 
noted scope for private-public partnerships to 
deliver ser vices better and improve 
efficiency.
•	 Legal	reform.	Here	the	consultants	recom-
mended reducing the more than 100 statutes 
influencing agriculture to the one single 
Agricultural Act - concerned primarily with 
health and safety, self-governance, competi-
tion and efficiency – by the end of 2005 
(Pearson et al. 2004).
Howell 2004 reports that these recommendations 
provoked resistance from ministry and parastatal staff and 
leaderships, some of whom had perhaps not appreciated 
the radical vision of SRA before then. Generally parastatal 
leadership interpreted the recommendations to mean 
loss of rents, control and influence while the ministry and 
parastatal staff saw loss of jobs through restructuring 
which would have followed.
Further momentum was lost through a bureaucratic 
reshuffle in mid-2004 in which the permanent secretaries 
of all three core ministries were moved (Howell 2004). 
However, in December 2005 Dr.Romano Kiome, one 
of the original architects of SRA, became Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture in a further 
reshuffle, while a second member of the core drafting 
team, Joseph Kinyua, was Permanent Secretary at the 
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Ministry of Finance – potentially a good axis for progress. 
(Both are still in post at the time of writing). The problem 
was that the other “rural development” ministries were 
by now reluctant to cooperate and resented what they 
saw as the Ministry of Agriculture’s attempts to tell them 
what to do.6
Thus, over time much of the responsibility for 
furthering the SRA agenda fell to the Agriculture 
Sector Coordinating Unit (ASCU) - the “TIC” (i.e. third 
tier in the implementation infrastructure) envisaged 
in the SRA implementation framework - which was 
eventually established in late 2004. From the outset, 
however, there was lack of clarity and consensus on 
ASCU’s role: was it to spearhead reform or monitor and 
support implementation by line ministries? Staff came 
from the three core ministries on secondments. Other 
ministries had no direct stake in ASCU, which did not 
exert any influence over the budgets received by different 
ministries or what they were earmarked for. Limited 
ASCU capacity for policy analysis was identified early 
on (Howell 2004; Bazeley 2005). Government of Kenya 
2010 acknowledges that ASCU was only “fully established 
and staffed” in 2006.
Since 2004 donors have focused much of their support 
for agricultural policy reform on building the capacity of 
ASCU to lead it. During 2004-07 basket donor funding 
came from Danida, DFID, GTZ and SIDA, with additional 
technical assistance from USAID and World Bank. In 
2007-10 a new phase of funding was agreed through 
the Agriculture Sector Support Programme. The project 
document noted  that, “In 2006, ASCU started to produce 
useful output – principally analyses of constraints and 
policy options (in five ‘fast-track’ priority areas ) through 
the work of five Thematic Working Groups drawn from 
the private sector, civil society, development partners, 
research and government” (ASSP 2007, para 3.6). In other 
words, it had taken two years to start producing “useful 
output” and even this was still analysis, i.e. no actual 
reform yet. It is also noteworthy that it was the parastatal 
reform working group that had not yet been established.
In 2010 a report was commissioned by the government 
and donors “to analyze the achievement of outputs 
and outcomes of the agricultural sector as expressed 
in the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture and make 
recommendations for future planning” (Lundgren 2010). 
This observed that ASCU had initiated many activities, but 
few had yet reached completion. Although it expressed 
confidence that the work of ASCU is “building a very 
good foundation from which positive impact on both 
production/productivity and poverty alleviation will 
eventually be possible”, it concluded that “delays in 
finalising policy, legal and institutional reforms” meant 
that, “the vast majority of the activities initiated under 
the SRA/ASDS have not yet led to any significant impact 
at local level” (Lundgren 2010, p9).
Revitalising Agricultural 
Extension?
Progress in “Improving delivery of … extension and 
advisory support services” – the second of SRA’s six 
“fast track” priority areas – provides a good illustration. 
In the years following the launch of SRA, there were at 
least three major donor projects supporting agricultural 
extension reform in Kenya: the SIDA-funded National 
Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme, which 
inter alia encouraged a “focal area” approach by which 
available extension resources focused on one location 
within a district each year to achieve maximum impact; 
the Decentralized Agriculture Support Structures 
programme under the DANIDA-funded Agriculture 
Sector Programme Support, which promoted multi-
stakeholder forums at district level to help set priorities 
for government (including extension) support to 
farmers, and the World Bank-funded Kenya Agriculture 
Productivity Project, which piloted demand-driven 
extension approaches creating space for multiple service 
providers. This should have been an ideal foundation 
for extension reform: the government could compare 
experiences across the three programmes and decide 
on the way forward for extension provision nationally.
Indeed, ASCU, through its thematic working group 
on research and extension, did seek to learn from these 
various programmes, though no formal, independent 
comparison of their performance was undertaken. This 
learning contributed to a new National Agriculture Sector 
Extension Policy, drafted in December 2005, followed 
by an implementation framework, a draft of which was 
produced in June 2007. The policy was, however, only 
approved by Cabinet in 2008 and the implementation 
framework is still being refined in the light of the 
provisions for devolved level of government contained 
in the new constitution eventually approved in a second 
referendum in August 2010 plus ongoing learning 
from the World Bank-funded KAPAP.7 The policy aims to 
encourage commercialisation of smallholder agriculture, 
rather than simply telling farmers how to produce more, 
and to move to a demand-driven approach, putting more 
onus on farmers to seek out extension staff or resources 
(available at information points in all districts) when 
they want information. Meanwhile, KAPAP continues 
to promote pluralistic extension provision, focusing on 
specific value chains, but still in pilot districts.
Drawing on case study work in four districts during 
2007 and 2009, Future Agricultures Consortium 
2009 found limited evidence of enhanced extension 
effort under the NARC government, related to the 
introduction of performance contracts for ministry 
staff. However, outreach to farmers was hampered by 
systemic inefficiencies in budgeting and resourcing plus 
the challenge of coordinating technical support across 
an increasing number of rural development ministries. 
Many respondents were sceptical of so-called demand-
driven extension, with farmers in particular wanting to 
discuss problems with frontline staff in their fields. As 
these challenges remain, it is safe to conclude that the 
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majority of Kenyan farmers have yet to experience any 
benefit from efforts to improve delivery of extension 
services since 2002.
Revitalising State 
Agricultural Organisations
Whilst little progress has been made in improving 
the delivery of public goods such as research and 
extension or in harmonizing the legal framework or 
restructuring parastatals so as to reduce the role of the 
state in agriculture since 2002, some state agricultural 
institutions have received a new lease of life. Three 
examples are instructive. Far from demonstrating a new 
approach to agricultural policy, they reveal a continuation 
of historic patterns, including the regional inequities that 
have characterised these.
Atieno and Kanyinga 2008 narrate the story of the 
revitalisation of Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), an 
organisation that was returned to public ownership in 
2003 following an underhand privatisation in the late 
Moi years. The Minister of Cooperative Development, 
with the backing of the Ministers of Agriculture and 
Livestock, masterminded the move to return KCC to 
public ownership when President Kibaki was ill (i.e. 
before the launch of the SRA, but also before relationships 
within the NARC coalition began to deteriorate). It was 
popular both for righting a perceived wrong from the 
Moi era and for providing a needed stimulus to the dairy 
industry (the money pumped into new KCC provided 
stronger competition in milk purchase to the two private 
processors). The benefits accrued principally to farmers 
in Central Province (the home area of both the Minister 
of Cooperative Development and the President) and Rift 
Valley (home area of the Minister of Agriculture).
Around the same time the Minister of Livestock, 
from Kamba in Eastern Province, authorised renewed 
investment in the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC). 
Farmers in northern Kenya who had voted for NARC 
hoped that revitalisation of KMC would enhance their 
access to the major markets for meat in the country. 
However, in this case revitalisation was restricted to a 
complete overhaul of the KMC factory at Machakos, also 
in the Kamba  region of Eastern Province.
The NARC government also promised action during its 
early years to revitalise the cotton sector. By 2005 a cotton 
bill had been drafted, but not presented to Parliament, so 
a private member from western Kenya, who won the right 
to present a bill in Parliament through the MPs’ ballot, 
worked with the leadership of the Kenya Cotton Growers 
Association to draft a bill establishing a Kenya Cotton 
Authority (KCA) with majority farmer representation 
on its board. The Ministry of Agriculture was unhappy 
with this and offered a deal whereby, if the private 
member withdrew her bill, the Ministry would present 
its bill instead. Because this would be a government 
bill, the KCA could be given revenue-raising powers, 
powers that cannot be established through a private 
member’s bill. However, the Ministry bill would stipulate 
a government-controlled board. The MP and KCGA opted 
for majority farmer representation on the KCA board and, 
therefore, to forego revenue-raising powers (for the 
time being!). Although the Minister of Agriculture was 
privately opposed to the bill, the government was at a 
low point in popularity – this was the time of its defeat 
in the first constitutional referendum and the formal split 
in the NARC coalition – and the Minister was persuaded 
not to publicly oppose the bill in the House, in case that 
increased its majority. However, with limited funding, 
KCA has yet to effect any change in fortunes in the Kenya 
cotton sector.
Interpretation of 
Agricultural Reform 
Experience 2002-12
With a new government in 2008 and the launching 
of Vision 2030 to replace ERS, SRA was replaced (four 
years early) in 2010 with the Agricultural Sector 
Development Strategy (ASDS) 2010-2020. ASDS rather 
fancifully claims that “implementation of the SRA has 
been largely successful” (p.vii), so aspires to build on this 
success. Its evidence for success includes: exceeding the 
SRA’s modest agricultural growth target for 2003-07 of 
3.1% p.a.; revival of KCC, KMC (see above) plus three other 
state corporations; development of “over 15 policies and 
6 pieces of legislation” (p5), including the National 
Agricultural Sector Extension Policy and the Cotton Act 
2006 (see above) and the revival of previously “moribund 
and dysfunctional” research and extension systems such 
that they are now “vibrant” (p4; c/w the assessment 
above!). However, a detailed reading shows that five of 
the six SRA “fast track” priority areas still remain to be 
tackled, the exception being the development of a Food 
Security and Nutrition Policy that was approved in 2011.
Unlike SRA, ASDS was produced collaboratively, the 
report preparation team led by the PS, Ministry of 
Agriculture, containing representatives of the now ten 
ministries concerned with agriculture and rural 
development, all of whose ministers signed it. It thus 
steps back from the radical language of SRA on state 
reform and is structured so as to recognise the distinct 
domains of the ten ministries. Nevertheless, it does still 
state an intention to “Divest from all state corporations 
handling production, processing and marketing that can 
be better done by the private sector” (p.xiv), reflecting 
the strong consensus amongst the local policy research 
community and some government officials that a 
reduced state role is essential if Kenyan agriculture is to 
thrive.
Given that this is still the agenda, why was so little 
progress made with SRA? Whilst bureaucratic opposition 
to radical reform of state structures is to be expected, 
this is certainly not the whole story in Kenya. Indeed, 
reform-minded technocrats have occupied key positions 
in government over the past decade, albeit without the 
ability to push change through when others were 
resistant. What has been lacking has been political 
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leadership, especially at ministerial level, to overcome 
opposition to the reform programme.
It is hard to say to what extent ministers in the first 
NARC government were ever signed up to the full SRA 
agenda. It is possible that the disparate groups within 
NARC agreed to bold manifesto pledges for the purpose 
of the 2002 election campaign but expected to be able 
to deliberate on the details once in power.  And once in 
power, vested ethno-regional political interests became 
a major obstacle to pursuance of the recommendations 
because of embedded political costs. Also the lack of 
consultation in the process of developing SRA did not 
allow this. Even Minister of Agriculture Kipruto Arap 
Kirwa, was in a somewhat delicate personal position 
when it came to the more radical reform proposals of 
SRA. As the lone Kalenjin minister in the NARC 
government, he could not be seen to be undermining 
NCPB, AFC or other state organisations that primarily 
benefited or were staffed by Kalenjins – certainly if this 
was not part of a systemic reform of the state sector in 
Kenyan agriculture. This, therefore, highlights the 
important point that key SRA reforms required collective 
action from all ministries, either because they had to 
agree on measures that would cut across more than one 
– for example, extension reform would affect staff in both 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock & Fisheries 
Development - or because they threatened interests of 
all ministries and ministers (e.g. parastatal reform), such 
that either all moved together or no one moved8. Such 
collective action required trust, which unfortunately 
began to break down within the NARC coalition within 
a few months of it coming to power. Moreover, as it 
became apparent that NARC would eventually split, 
Ministers (as champions of their regional interests in 
government) had a strong incentive to hold onto sources 
of rents that could enable them to maintain their own 
position in future political fights. The same logic holds 
today. Meanwhile, the decisive and early actions taken 
by some of the same ministers to revitalise KCC and KMC 
- moves which arguably were at variance with the 
subsequent thrust of SRA to reduce the state’s role in 
productive activity within the agricultural sector - showed 
the importance of such rents.
Democratisation and the 
Politics of Agricultural 
Policy in Kenya
This paper has argued that historic patterns of policy 
making have prevailed in Kenya over the past decade, 
despite 1) widespread recognition that they have 
generated sub-optimal growth and poverty reduction 
outcomes and 2) a bold strategy with presidential 
backing (the SRA) that sought to change them. The 
question, therefore, is: why have senior Kenyan policy 
makers not felt greater pressure to deliver more 
fundamental agricultural reform? Specifically, why have 
two decades of democratisation, which in theory should 
strengthen the voice of the poor, rural majority in the 
country (Bates and Block 2009), not done so?
To answer this, we have to look at how people actually 
vote: do they exchange votes for policy?
There is emerging evidence that Kenyan (Bratton and 
Kimenyi 2008) and other African (Bratton et al. 2011) 
voters do assess overall government performance, and 
also specifically the performance of their president when 
voting in both presidential elections. However, this is not 
the only – or even the major – factor that they consider. 
As already noted, a striking feature of Kenyan politics is 
the strength of ethno-regional identities. This is well 
illustrated by Bratton and Kimenyi 2008: in a logistic 
regression to explain voting intentions in the December 
2007 election (for/against the re-election of President 
Kibaki), 51% of the variation was explained simply by 
dummies for the eight major ethnic groups: Kikuyu and 
Embu/Meru (positive), Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin and Luhya 
(negative), all significant at 5%; Kisii and Mijikenda not 
significant. This may be explained in part by the high 
level of inter-ethnic mistrust, revealed by Afrobarometer 
surveys (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). However, 
fundamentally it seems that voters make an assessment 
of what is good for their group and not just for themselves 
as individuals.
In this context regional “champions” present 
themselves as people able to represent the collective 
interests of their group, which invariably is taken to mean 
accessing the state and its resources for the purpose of 
‘developing’ the group and its region. They seek the vote 
of group members by convincing them that they will 
defend and promote group interests. The First Past the 
Post electoral system offers the incentive to mobilise the 
groups for support. In turn, because of this electoral 
system and in the absence of institutionalised national 
parties, to win a presidential election, a candidate has 
to assemble a coalition of these regional “champions” 
who can deliver sufficient votes from their regions to 
obtain an overall majority. The question, then, is what 
offer has to be made to each of these champions so as 
1) to gain their support and 2) to enable them to bring 
in votes from their region?
In a context of limited accountability for performance, 
control of a ministry may provide both a source of 
personal gain (or rents to close allies and friends) and a 
source of rents for distribution to supporters. Thus, as 
the governing coalition in Kenya has become increasingly 
complex over the past decade, the number of Ministries 
has increased, so that more players can be accommodated 
at the highest level of government. Ministries have also 
gained an increasingly regional focus. Thus, MoL&FD split 
into Livestock, which has become the domain of Kenya’s 
pastoralist communities, and Fisheries, whilst the Ministry 
of Northern Kenya and Arid Lands [check] has been 
created.
Strikingly, all three Ministers of Agriculture under 
President Kibaki (Kirwa, Ruto, Kosgei) have been Kalenjins. 
The reasons for this “coincidence” are inevitably somewhat 
speculative, as little is known about the negotiations 
within the governing coalition over the distribution of 
ministries. (However, it seems that Ruto did choose the 
Ministry during the 2007-08 negotiations over the 
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formation of the government of national unity). 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that protection of the rent 
to surplus maize producers (discussed earlier) has been 
part of the calculation, now that President Moi - fellow 
Kalenjin and architect of the rise of NCPB – was no longer 
in post and given that many others within the population 
lose out from the same policy (Jayne et al. 2008; Mghenyi 
et al. 2011) . In fact, Minister Ruto used his position not 
just to protect maize producer prices, but also to 
distribute other rents to allies through fertiliser and maize 
sale policies that became national scandals. When he 
was forced to resign over these, what is perhaps most 
surprising is that a third member of the same group was 
chosen to succeed him: recognition that control of the 
Ministry of Agriculture was seen by one of the country’s 
largest communities as central to their economic interests 
and that it was too risky to take it away, given the delicate 
state of inter-ethnic relations in the country at the time?
A technocratic view of policy making sees ministries 
as key vehicles for the implementation of formally stated 
national policies, which often highlight the delivery of 
public goods. However, the arguments above suggest 
a very different logic. This may give clues as to why there 
has been so little momentum from ministers for extension 
reform, which might be expected to benefit a large 
proportion of Kenyan farmers, rather than particular 
groups, as well as why radical reform of state organisations 
in agriculture has made no headway. Ultimately, the 
strong ethno-regional dimension to Kenyan politics 
means that a poor Luo smallholder in western Kenya 
feels more affinity to wealthier Luos than to a poor Kikuyu 
or Kalenjin smallholder in another part of the country: 
there is no “class-based” demand for national public 
goods, such as a better extension service, that would 
bring the greatest benefit to resource-poor farmers. And 
because of the strong ethno-regional dimension of 
politics, there is limited or no attention to class-based 
forms of organisation that can cut across the various 
regions. Each region has its unique challenges and the 
ethnic character of these grievances makes it difficult to 
organise for national public goods.
We can also link these arguments to poverty and 
inequality dynamics within regions. What might 
determine the balance of personal gain (or rents to close 
allies and friends) and rents for wider distribution to 
supporters that a regional champion seeks from a 
ministry? Following the logic of Boone 2003, we might 
expect this balance to depend, at least in part, on the 
nature of the relationships between regional leaderships 
and the broader rural population. In hierarchical societies, 
where leaders can readily persuade followers to vote in 
a particular way, followers may gain little benefit from 
their support. By contrast, in more democratic societies, 
individual voters may want to see direct personal benefits 
in exchange for their vote.
By way of illustration, we contrast three of the main 
ethnic groups in Kenya:
•	 Luo	culture	is	hierarchical,	both	at	family	level	
(a younger sibling should not marry before 
their older one) and in the pervasive influence 
of Luo council(s) of elders within Luo elders. 
The “regional champion” can convey views 
through them and secure strong voting 
allegiance10. 
•	 Within	Rift	Valley,	 first	President	Moi	 then	
William Ruto established themselves as 
“regional champion”, such that (for example) 
they could let it be known which candidate 
they favoured as MP for an area and their view 
would hold sway with many voters. However, 
to maintain their mantle, both men have had 
to listen to the views of local interest groups, 
especially larger farmers who are locally well 
organised, and to deliver benefits to them.
•	 During	their	24	years	out	of	power	between	
Presidents Kenyatta and Kibaki, there was 
competition for the leadership of the Kikuyus. 
This made Kikuyu society more independent 
of their leadership, such that many individual 
voters now expect benefits in return for their 
support of particular leaders. This independ-
ence is reinforced by above-average education 
and wealth by Kenyan standards, but conversely 
may also contribute to the benefits that Central 
Province has gained during the Kibaki 
presidency. 
In general, however, regional champions are able to 
gather votes without delivering the policies or 
investments – for example, in agricultural public goods 
– that would bring the greatest benefits to the majority 
of their supporters. In turn, this means that there is no 
political necessity for radical overhaul of state functioning 
in agriculture; continuation of the historic policies of 
periodic revitalisation of state agricultural organisations 
will suffice.
What might cause this to change?
1. Greater articulation of “class” interests by 
poor smallholder households, irrespective of 
ethnicity – this is unlikely to happen any time 
soon, though it is undoubtedly desirable as a 
longer-term change.
2. Renewed – and possibly even more widespread 
– descent into rural chaos and violence, fuelled 
by limited progress with rural growth and 
(especially) poverty reduction, in a context 
of increasing competition for scarce land 
and natural resources, contributing to the 
ease with which demagogues could channel 
resentments along inter-ethnic lines. 
We, of course, fervently hope that latter does not 
happen and our intention is not to make a prediction. 
Rather, we note that, under either scenario, the political 
calculation that “we cannot go on as we are” would then 
be aligned with the technocratic assessment of the 
authors of SRA.
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Notes
1 Inequality extends to service access, not just 
consumption
2 This form of land concentration limited the 
impact of land reforms which the Kenyatta 
government initiated from the early 1960s with 
an emphasis on resettlement and redistribution 
through land buying companies (Kanyinga 
2009).
3 Although private traders were allowed to buy 
maize in competition with NCPB in 1988, 
restrictions on cross-district private maize trade 
were only eliminated in 1995.
4  The cotton case is a useful reminder that there 
may still be a need for some commodity chain-
focused state organisations in the country, i.e. 
we are not arguing for the baby to be thrown out 
with the bathwater! Particularly after years of 
decline, the cotton industry lacks a strong private 
sector actor to provide strategic leadership for 
recovery. If a public organisation does not 
provide the coordination needed for the various 
stakeholders (farmers, ginners, input suppliers) 
to invest in renewed productivity and production, 
then this is unlikely to happen at all. 
5 interview 23/05/2012),
6 Interview 23/05/2012).
7 Interview, 31/07/2012.
8 Failure to reform the cooperatives that dominate 
the coffee sector is one of the more surprising 
features of the 2002-12 experience, given the 
importance of the sector to national foreign 
exchange revenues and that politicisation and 
bad governance are widely seen as root causes 
of the sector’s decline over the past two decades 
(see, for example, Owuor et al. 2009). An initiative 
to reform the coffee sector, supported by Minister 
Kirwa, was blocked by the “Mount Kenya mafia” 
(interview 23/05/2012).
9 In fact, Mghenyi et al. 2011 find the welfare losses 
from high maize prices to be less than they 
expected, which might help explain the policy’s 
persistence. 
10 Two caveats to this: 1) Raila “holding back” from 
appearing to favour Luos too much in bid to 
appear presidential to wider national electorate, 
which is alternative explanation for relatively few 
benefits delivered to them; 2) some recent 
resistance to Raila calling all the political shots 
amongst Luos
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